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Insolvency and the Australian Safe Harbour Reforms of 2017 – Do they Adequately 
Support all Australian Directors in Fulfilling their Role as a Fiduciary of their Company 




As fiduciaries, Australian company directors will be acting in best interests of their 
company and for a proper purpose where they use their management powers to maximize 
profits for its shareholders, considering all of the interests of the corporation, including 
its continued existence and its interest in pursuing lawful activity. However, upholding 
these duties was negatively impacted by the apprehension of insolvency under the 
Australian insolvent trading laws as they were prior to the 2017 legislative reforms. The 
fear of associated personal liability that directors could face disincentivised them from 
taking appropriate business risks outside of formal insolvency situations. Following the 
temporary support measures implemented by the Australian Government in March 2020 
to assist companies in financial distress due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic, additional legislative reforms were introduced to assist small company 
businesses experiencing financial distress in January 2021. Whilst these new reforms are 
welcome, this Article presents suggestions for further reform in order to provide 
additional support for all Australian company directors so that they can confidently 
fulfill their fiduciary duties to their companies, and to broaden much needed 
entrepreneurialism and innovation approaches for all Australian company businesses.  
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In September 2017, legislative reforms in Australia were introduced to its corporate insolvent 
trading laws under the Part 5.7B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA). Section 588HA CA 
required the new reforms to be reviewed 2 years following their introduction, however as of 
May 2021, this has not formally occurred. It may be that the delay is due to 2 years not being 
an adequate time period for an effective review to be undertaken.  However, there have been 
some legislative changes implemented in this area of the law in January 2021, which were 
introduced to assist small company businesses in financial distress, following the conclusion 
of the temporary measures that were introduced by the Australian government in March 2020 
as part their response to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, there are 
now some limited judicial determinations which have considered the 2017 reforms.1 These new 
developments present Australian legislators with an opportunity to review the 2017 reforms, 
by focusing on their real and /or perceived shortcomings. This Article aims to assist Australian 
legislators by bringing together a critical analysis of the 2017 reforms as they stand in 2021 in 
order to determine if their objectives have thus far been met: to support all Australian company 
directors in fulfilling their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their company and for a 
proper purpose, during times of financial and operational restructuring outside of formal 
insolvency situations. Economic growth and efficiency in the Australian economy being the 
overall aim.2  
 
In Part 1, the theoretical underpinning of the role of directors as fiduciaries in companies in the 
context of suspected insolvent trading is first canvassed. A brief overview of the corporate 
insolvent trading laws in Australian under the CA prior to the 2017 reforms is presented, and 
the various defences that were (and still are) available to directors in times of suspected 
insolvency under s 588H CA are examined. Judicial discretions available under ss 1317S and 
1318 CA to excuse full or part liability for directors who have been subject to civil breaches of 
insolvency laws, together with their limitations are also explored. Why reform to the corporate 
insolvent trading laws in Australia was required is further elaborated on in Part 2.  This 
historical focus provides the background rationales that drove the impetuses of the 2017 
legislative changes, noting that  the corporate insolvent trading laws in Australia prior to the 
                                                 
1 Re Balmz Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] VSC 652; Habrok (Dalgaranga) Pty Ltd v Gascoyne Resources Ltd [2020] 
FCA 1395. 
2 Australian Productivity Commission, Business Set Up, Transfer and Closure. Productivity Commission Inquiry 






2017 legislative reforms arguably were having a negative effect on much needed 
entrepreneurialism in many Australian business sectors.3  It is noted that the underpinning 
objectives of the 2017 legislative reforms were to encourage directors to make appropriate 
business decisions in times of corporate ‘restructuring outside of formal insolvency’,4 and to 
‘…promote a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation which will help drive business 
growth, local jobs and global success.’5 Part 3 then evaluates a number of real and perceived 
shortcomings of the 2017 legislative reforms, in light of their performance over the last three 
years of operation. Most notably, given that the burden of proof to show that the safe harbour 
provisions do not apply, fall to a plaintiff (generally a creditor), this has still left directors 
unsure of what actions they should be taking with regard to restructuring activities in times of 
pre-insolvency. In addition, the time when insolvency is triggered and the period when the 
‘safe harbour’ provisions are to apply are also still uncertain.  
 
Part 4 then examines the temporary measures6 that the Australian government introduced on 
25 March 2020 in order to assist companies experiencing financial distress due to the economic 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. These temporary measures predominately ceased on 31 
December 2020.  An overview is also provided of the additional legislative reforms that were 
introduced to assist small company businesses experiencing financial distress in January 2021. 
To provide support for future reform to the Australian corporate insolvency laws, a concise 
international perspective is presented in Part 5 of this Article. Particular focus is made on the 
corporate insolvent trading laws as they apply in the United States (US), the United Kingdom 
(UK) and New Zealand (NZ).  
 
The Australian 2017 legislative reforms to corporate insolvency laws have gone some way in 
addressing Australian insolvency law’s previous limitations. The  additional legislative reforms 
as introduced in January 2021 whose objective is to assist small businesses in financial distress 
have extended on this. Whilst these new reforms are welcome, this Article presents suggestions 
for further reform to Australian insolvency laws in order to provide additional support for all 
Australian company directors so that they can confidently fulfil their fiduciary duties to their 
                                                 
3 Ibid 5. 
4 Jason Harris, ‘Reforming insolvent trading to encourage restructuring: safe harbour or sleepy hollows?’ (2016) 
27 Journal of Banking, Finance, Law & Practice 294, 294.  
5 Australian Productivity Commission (n 2) 5. 






companies, and to broaden much needed entrepreneurialism and innovation approaches for all 
Australian company businesses. 
 
Part 1.  The Role of Directors and the Company 
The laws that govern companies in Australia are drawn upon the principles of the Companies 
Act 1862 (UK), which adopted a lassie faire approach to company law, with its historical focus 
being on profit maximisation for the benefit of shareholders. These principles were 
predominately underpinned by the ‘shareholder primacy’ theory, as espoused by Adolf Berle.7 
This theory contends that directors, as agents of their company are in a position of trust, and 
thus owe a fiduciary responsibility to the company’s shareholders. In the 1742 UK case of 
Charitable Corp v Sutton8, Lord Hardwick LC noted ‘…by accepting a trust of this sort, a 
person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence.’9 The level of the standard 
of care for directors at that time was one of ‘gross neglect’ or ‘crassa negligentia’.10 This duty 
found itself based in equity which limited directors free exercise of their corporate powers 
where such powers ‘...[were] necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit 
of all the shareholders as their interest appears.’11 The ‘invisible hand’ doctrine reinforced this 
position which outlined that: 
Individuals should simply seek to maximise profits; profit seeking frees us from having to make 
controversial value judgements. The “invisible hand” doctrine assures us that profit seeking will invariably 
lead to the most economically efficient allocation of resources which, in turn, will produce the greatest 
utility for the world taken as a whole.12 
 
This fiduciary duty also exists in Australian company law which requires directors to exercise 
their management powers only where they consider it is in the best interests of the company 
and not for an improper or collateral purpose.13 While this seems to take on a subjective 
approach, some support for objectivity was provided for in Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds 
Bank Ltd where Pennycuick J applied the test as: 
 
                                                 
7 See generally Adolph Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049.  
8 Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 400, 406; 26 ER 642. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Joshua Getzler, ‘Duty of Care’ in Birks and Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing, 2002) 45, 47.  
11 Berle (n 7) 1049.  
12 See David Silverstein, ‘Managing Corporate Social Responsibility in a Changing Legal Environment’ (1987) 
25 American Business Law Journal 525; Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 400, 406; 26 ER 642; and 
Joseph Bishop, ‘Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors’ and 
Officers’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 1078, 1096 -1097. 






...whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the company concerned, could, in 
the whole of the existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions were for the benefit 
of the company.14 
 
It followed then that directors had a primary duty to ensure that they maximise profits of the 
company for the benefit of its shareholders both in the short and long term. How long the long 
term is – is questionable however. As noted by Langton and Trotman,  
...exactly how long remains unspecified. For that reason, it is submitted that the phrase ‘best interests of 
the company’ should be equated in Australia with ruthless profit maximisation over some unspecified 
period.15  
 
As such, it was felt that directors were tasked to give primacy to the advancement of profit 
maximisation at all costs. Company law in Australia has however further progressed so that 
profit maximisation is not the only factor that is important when determining if they are acting 
in the best interests of the company. For example, ss 180 -183 CA provide that directors must 
exercise their powers by using due care and diligence, by acting in good faith, and not to use 
their position in the company or the company’s information for personal gain.16 In the recent 
appeal case of Cassimatis v Australian Securities Investment Commission17 the Full Federal 
Court confirmed that directors have a duty to exercise a degree of care and diligence under s 
180(1) CA while having regard to the company’s best interests. In this case, the appellants, Mr 
and Mrs Cassimatis were directors and sole shareholders of the financial advice firm, Storm 
Financial Pty Ltd. The trial judge found that they had failed to exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties with care and diligence as required under s 180(1) CA particularly 
because they had caused the company to contravene s 945A CA as it appeared at the time18 and 
this raised a risk to the company’s continuation. The appeal court confirmed the primary 
judge’s finding that the directors, Mr and Mrs Cassimatis, had breached these duties by 
exercising their powers in a way that caused inappropriate advice to be given to certain 
vulnerable investors by their company.19 The appellants had argued that the alleged breach of 
their duties under s180(1) CA occurred while the Storm Pty Ltd was solvent, and at the time 
                                                 
14 Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) 1 Ch. 62, 74.  
15 Robert Langton and Lindsay Trotman, ‘Defining the Best Interests of the Corporation: Some Australian Reform 
Proposals’ (1999) 3 Flinders Law Review Law Journal 163, 176.  
16 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180-184. 
17 [2020] FCAFC 52. 
18 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) previous s 945A (2)(a) which set out that in providing general advice to a 
retail client, the provider had an obligation to warn clients that the advice does not consider their objectives, 
financial situation or needs. This section has now been repealed and has been replaced with s 961A CA which 
sets out the obligation to act in the best interests of the client in relation to the provision of personal advice with 
regard to a financial product.  






they were the only shareholders, thus Storm Pty Ltd’ s interests were in line with its 
shareholders. Further, they argued that because they held all the issued shares in the company, 
they were therefore entitled to prioritise their own and the company’s interests in operating the 
company’s financial model (the Storm Model) over minimising other risks (including possible 
adverse actions taken by ASIC or dissatisfied investors). However, Thawley J dismissed this 
argument saying: ‘…it is step too far to say that 100% shareholders can approve their own 
contravention of s 180(1) as directors.’20  
 
In Australia, these duties are owed to the company as a whole.21 In Cassimatis the court noted 
that there is a balancing exercise required, where the duty to the company is not:  
… necessarily confined to commercial considerations or to a comparison of monetary consequences, but 
extends to considering all of the interests of the corporation, including its continued existence and its 
interest in pursuing lawful activity.22 
 
It is arguable that such duties can also extend to the interests of a company’s creditors in times 
of insolvency. This position was considered in the Australian context by Mason J in Walker v 
Winborne23 where he said: 
…the directors of a company in discharging their duty to the company must take account of the interests 
of its shareholders and creditors. Any failure by the directors to take into account the interests of creditors 
will have adverse consequences for the company as well as for them.24  
 
Street CJ in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd 25 supported this position noting: 
...where a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become prospectively entitled, 
through the mechanism of liquidation, to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal with 
the company's assets. It is in a practical sense their assets and not the shareholders' assets that, through the 
medium of the company, are under the management of the directors pending either liquidation, return to 
solvency, or the imposition of some alternative administration.26  
 
This supports the view that where a company cannot continue trading without relying totally 
on creditor funds, ‘the interests of the company are in reality the interests of existing creditors 
alone.’27 However, the general view in times of insolvency is that this duty to creditors is an 
                                                 
20 Cassimatis v Australian Securities Investment Commission [2020] FCAFC 52 at [472]. 
21 See for example Percival v Wright [1902] UKLawRpCh 125;[1902] 2 Ch 421; Multinational Gas & 
Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258 and Grove v Flavel (1986) 
43 SASR 410, 417. Also see Spies v R (2000) 201 CLR 603, where the court suggested that the interests of 'the 
company' was to be viewed distinct from those of its creditors, and held that directors do not owe an enforceable 
duty to creditors.  
22 Cassimatis v Australian Securities Investment Commission [2020] FCAFC 52 at [459]. 
23 (1976) 137 CLR 1. 
24 Ibid 7. 
25 (1986) 4 NSWLR 722. 
26 Ibid 730. 






indirect duty which is owed by the company to consider creditor interests overall.28 The 
Australian position was set out in Spies v R29 where the court confirmed that the ‘duty’ so far 
as creditors were concerned was an aspect of  directors’ duty to the company. It was not a direct 
duty owed to creditors or enforceable by them.30  
 
More concerning are those times where a company is solvent but may be approaching 
insolvency, because this is the period when directors are faced with a number of tensions. In 
such times a company’s shareholders, rather than risk further trading, may wish to extract what 
they can in the form of dividends. Creditors at the same time may want to ensure that the 
company preserves its funds, so that they can be paid their debts when due. Alternatively, 
shareholders may want the company to take appropriate business risks, to be entrepreneurial 
so as to maximise the prospect of making future profits. In such times, making dividend 
payments to shareholders or taking on risky business decisions can, in economic terms amount 
to a shift in value to a company’s shareholders at the expense of its creditors.31  
 
This is where tensions lie – in times of financial distress of a company, where restructuring 
activities may be undertaken (pre-insolvency) by directors in order to serve the best interests 
of the company: 
 directors can find themselves taking actions which they believe are in the best interests 
of the company;  
 creditors and shareholders having a subjective opinion whether these actions are indeed 
in the best interests of the company; and  
 directors taking risk adverse actions, in order to protect themselves from personal 
liability. 
Over time, these tensions have contributed to the development of the insolvent trading laws 
which we have in place in Australia today.32  
 
                                                 
28 Mills v Northern Railway of Buenos Ayres Co [1870] UKLawRpCh 73; (1870) 5 Ch App 62. In times of 
insolvency, this duty cannot be enforced by creditors directly, where they must rely on the appointment of a 
liquidator who will promote their interests.  
29 (2000) 201 CLR 603. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Edward M Iacobucci, ‘Directors’ Duties in Insolvency: Clarifying What is at Stake’ (2003) Canadian 
Business Law Journal 398, 401.  
32 See generally Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry (Harmer Report), (Report No 






1.1 Why the Need for Insolvent Trading Laws? 
It has been argued that the corporate insolvent trading laws in Australia prior to the 2017 
reforms were necessarily strict because this could ensure that directors actively monitored the 
company’s finances, which was in fact good business practice.33 Indeed, the consequences of 
insolvency can negatively affect many parties, including shareholders, creditors, employees, 
the Australian Tax Office (ATO), suppliers and the general public. The laws as they were prior 
to the 2017 reforms attempted to balance the competing interests of all stakeholders. It was 
noted by the Australian Law Reform Commission’s 1988 inquiry that ‘the fundamental purpose 
of an insolvency law was to provide a fair and orderly process for dealing with the financial 
affairs of insolvent individuals and companies.’34 This approach however did not always permit 
directors to adequately address their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company 
and for a proper purpose, as they were burdened to take into account not only the maximisation 
of wealth of the company’s shareholders, but to also consider other stakeholders interests 
(including creditors) and consider their own personal liabilities as well. These tensions 
inevitably impacted on directors’ abilities or confidences to take on appropriate business risks 
and to be entrepreneurial in times when company debt restructuring was required.   
 
As part of the company laws derived from the UK, corporate insolvent trading laws and 
associated liability for directors in Australia have been in place since 1961.35 Initially, director 
liability was based on a director knowingly being a party to the incurring of a debt in those 
circumstances where there was no reasonable or probable expectation for the company being 
in a position to pay that debt.36 The laws as they were in the 1960s however did not permit 
creditors to seek compensation directly from directors, or for liquidators to sue directors 
directly. Directors were nevertheless subject to criminal sanctions for a breach of the corporate 
insolvent trading laws, however no personal liabilities applied.37 In the 1980s, the Australian 
Companies Code was introduced, which made provision for civil liabilities to be imposed on 
directors in those circumstances where they had permitted their company to trade where there 
                                                 
33 Harris (n 4) 297. Harris defines debt restructuring as ‘… a situation where a company has become over-
leveraged with debt and needs to alter the nature of some or all of the debt obligations so as to facilitate the 
company to return to profitability at some point in the future.’ 
34 Harmer Report (n 31) 3.  
35 Companies Act 1961 (NSW) s 303(3).  
36 Harris (n 4) 295. 
37 See Andrew Keay and Michael Murray, ‘Making Corporation Directors Liable: A Comparative Analysis of 
Wrongful Trading in the United Kingdom and Insolvent Trading in Australia’ (2005) 14 International Insolvency 






were ‘reasonable grounds to expect that the company would not be able to pay all its debts 
when they become due.’38 Following the passing of 1992 Corporate Law Reform Bill, both 
civil and criminal liability for directors for a breach of the corporate insolvent trading laws has 
applied.39  
 
The current corporate insolvent trading laws in Australia are now contained in Part 5.7B, ss 
588C – 588ZB CA. In particular, the current elements of s 588G CA set out:  
 that the duty to prevent insolvent trading applies only to a person who was a director at 
the time when the company incurred a debt;40 and  
 the company ‘was insolvent at the time, or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt by 
incurring at that time debts including that debts’;41 and  
 at ‘that time there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent 
or would so become insolvent’;42 and  
 the person was aware at the time that there are such grounds for suspecting insolvency 
or a ‘reasonable person in a like position in a company in the company’s circumstances 
would be so aware’.43 
Civil liability can be imposed in circumstances where a company is insolvent and the director 
or a reasonable person in their position had grounds to suspect insolvency, and they fail to stop 
it from incurring debts at that time.44 Notably, there is no definition of ‘debt’ under the CA. A 
debt can nevertheless be a deemed debt for the purposes of incurring a debt under s 588G(1) 
CA.45 A deemed debt under s 588G(1A) CA includes: redeeming redeemable preference 
shares, buy back of shares, the payment or declaration of a dividend, making a reduction of 
share capital other than cancellation of shares for no consideration, financially assisting a 
person to acquire shares in itself or in a holding company, as well as entering into an 
uncommercial transaction within the meaning of s 588FB CA. Other debts are those defined at 
                                                 
38 Paul James, Ian Ramsay and Polat Siva, ‘Insolvent Trading: An Empirical Study’ (2004) 12 Insolvency Law 
Journal 210, 210.  
39 Jenny Schultz, ‘Liability of Directors for Corporate Insolvency - The New Reforms’ (1993) 5(2.4) Bond Law 
Journal 191,191.  
40 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G(1)(a). 
41 Ibid s 588G(1)(b). 
42 Ibid s 588G(1)(c). 
43 Ibid s 588G(2). 
44 Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266; 40 ALJR 13.  






common law.46 Crucially, a director can be liable for corporate insolvent trading even where 
they are not responsible for or are unaware of a debt being allowed to be incurred. For example, 
in Elliot v ASIC 47 it was held that despite Mr Elliot holding a non-executive director position, 
where he had little to do with day to day operations of the companies, he nevertheless had a 
duty to protect the creditors from the inevitable insolvency of the companies. The court found 
that he had breached the insolvent trading provisions by ‘not preventing’ or ‘failing to prevent’ 
the companies from incurring a debt because there were reasonable grounds for suspecting 
insolvency when those debts were incurred.48  
 
Today, the insolvency laws in Australia provide that in those situations where formal corporate 
insolvency applies, and a company has been placed into liquidation, the liquidator can sue 
directors personally for breaches of general law and statutory law duties under Part 2D.1 CA 
as well as for any breach of ss 588G-M(2) CA, where they are able to recover any damages or 
losses that the company may have incurred because of the breach. Creditors too may be in a 
position to sue directors personally.49 Where a director is been found to be acting fraudulently, 
s 588G(3) CA will permit the regulator, the Australian Investment and Securities Commission 
(ASIC) to seek criminal sanctions. 
 
1.1.1 Taking Appropriate Business Risks and the application of Judicial Relief  
Relief from personal liability for directors for possible civil breaches may be available by an 
exercise of judicial discretion under ss 1317S CA and 1318 CA if the court considers there has 
been honest conduct, and in the circumstances, ‘the person ought fairly be excused for the 
contravention.’50  
 
Under s 1317S CA, if eligible civil penalty proceedings are bought before a court (which can 
include inter alia a contravention of s 588M CA and s 588W CA),51 and the court finds that 
                                                 
46 For example, in John Graham Reprographics Pty Ltd v Steffens (1987) 5ACLC 904, the court considered 
whether or not an agreement to pay interest constitutes a debt. Connelly J held that interest payable under an 
agreement to pay, was incurred as a debt when the initial contract was entered into. The interest itself was not an 
independent debt however.  
47 (2004) VSCA 54. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Equiticorp Finance Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1993) 32 NSWLR 50, 146. 
50 Hall v Poolman (2007) 215 FLR 243; 65 ACSR 123. 
51 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588M which provides for recovery of compensation from directors for loss 
resulting from insolvent trading, by liquidators or creditors. Also see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 588V and 






the person acted honestly, having regard to all the circumstances, ‘the court may relieve the 
person either wholly or partly from a liability to which the person would otherwise be subject, 
or that might otherwise be imposed on the person, because of the contravention.’52 Olsson J in 
Powell v Fryer53 noted that ‘[t]he authorities indicate that a director acts ‘honestly’…when he 
acts bona fide in the interests of the company, including unsecured creditors of that entity.’54  
 
Section 1318 CA is similar in operation to s 1317S CA and applies where civil proceedings 
have been taken against a person for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty. It is 
open to the court, where it considers that the person acted honestly, having regard to all the 
circumstances, to ‘relieve the person either wholly or partly from liability on such terms as the 
court thinks fit.’55 This section applies to officers (including directors), auditors or experts in 
relation to the matter in question.56 
 
Arguably both ss 1317S and 1318 CA give directors some comfort in times of debt 
restructuring. Both provisions’ objective is to serve the public interest. They aim to balance the 
harm that can be done to companies where directors are found to not be acting in the 
companies’ best interests, with the need to support directors when they are undertaking honest 
conduct.’57 Without such discretions available, it is arguable that even fewer persons will 
undertake such roles.  
 
Historically these provisions have rarely been used by the courts, and where they have been 
applied, their protection abilities for director liability have been limited. In earlier cases, the 
courts were reluctant to apply the discretions in relation to insolvent trading breaches by 
directors. For example, in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich,58 the court declined 
to apply the discretion under s 1318 CA as it did not consider a breach of the insolvent trading 
laws (as they were at that time) was a cause for proceedings to be bought under the section. 
                                                 
52 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317S(2). 
53 (2001) 159 FLR 433, 450 [111]. 
54 Powell v Fryer (2001) 159 FLR 433, 450 [111]; Marchesi v Barnes [1970] VR 434; Dominion Insurance Co of 
Australia Ltd (in Liq) v Finn (1988) 7 ACLC 25 at 33-34. 
55 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1318(1). 
56 Ibid s 1318(4)(1). 
57 Powell v Fryer (2001) 159 FLR 433, 450 [111]; Marchesi v Barnes [1970] VR 434; Dominion Insurance Co of 
Australia Ltd (in Liq) v Finn (1988) 7 ACLC 25 at 33-34. 






That is, it was not a cause for ‘negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust.’59 In later 
cases the courts considered that because the insolvent trading laws imposed duties on directors 
to prevent insolvent trading, this was sufficient cause for proceedings for relief to be bought 
under s 1318 CA.60 For example, in Hall v Poolman,61 Palmer J ruled that s 1318 CA could 
apply in cases of insolvent trading breaches by directors under Part 5.7B CA, where a 
determination of ‘honest conduct’ supported the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 1318 
CA, with Palmer J noting: 
…the Court should be concerned only with the question whether the person has acted honestly in the 
ordinary meaning of the term, i.e. whether the person has acted without deceit or conscious impropriety, 
without intent to gain improper benefit or advantage for himself, herself or for another, and without 
carelessness or imprudence to such a degree as to demonstrate that no genuine attempt has been [made] to 
carry out the duties and obligations of his or her office imposed by the Corporations Act or general law. A 
failure to consider the interests of the company as a whole, or more particularly the interests of creditors, 
may be of such a degree as to demonstrate failure to act honestly in this sense. However, if failure to 
consider the interests of the company as a whole, including the interests of creditors, does not rise to such 
a high degree but is the result of an error of judgment, no finding of failure to act honestly should be 
made.62 
 
Palmer J found that while an error of commercial judgement had been made by the director in 
question, this did not amount to a failure to act honestly. To find otherwise would have been 
‘most hurtful, damaging and unfair to him and anyone in his position.’63 In applying his 
discretion on whether the director ‘ought to be fairly excused’, Palmer J noted that decisions 
made by active and diligent directors, during times of financial difficulties, required careful 
evaluation. He was sympathetic in his understanding of what directors such as the director in 
question faced in times of a company’s financial difficulties: 
It is sometimes a difficult decision for a director of a trading company suffering from liquidity problems 
to decide whether, and when, to abandon hope of a change in the company’s fortunes and to summon the 
administrators. …When confronted with the necessity of making a decision involving these factors, a 
director cannot afford to procrastinate or to avoid confronting realities. He or she must ask and honestly 
answer [hard questions regarding how, and when, the company will be able to pay its debts.64 
 
Palmer J exercised his discretion to partially relieve the director’s breach of duty under s 1318 
CA based on consideration of ‘all of the circumstances to whether the action was commercially 
reasonable.’65 In addition, the director was still liable for costs. Contrastingly, in The Stake 
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Man Pty Ltd v Carroll66, the Federal Court fully exonerated a director from liability for 
insolvent trading based, inter alia on honesty and fairness, under the judicial discretion 
provisions ss 1317 and1318 CA. In this case, the defences under s 588H CA were not able to 
be satisfied by the director. However, Goldberg J was nevertheless satisfied that the director 
did not act:  
…with deceit or conscious impropriety, [was] without intent to gain improper benefit or advantage for 
himself, herself or for another, and [was] without carelessness or imprudence to such a degree as to 
demonstrate that no genuine attempt at all has been to carry out the duties and obligations of his or her 
office imposed by the Corporations Act or the general law.67  
 
However, costs were once again imposed upon the director, who was ordered to pay the 
liquidators costs.  
 
These outcomes highlight while the discretions under ss 1317S and 1318 CA can partially or 
fully exonerate directors for breaches of insolvent trading in certain circumstances, nonetheless 
they may not always be completely free from all financial impacts personally.  As noted above, 
there have been very few cases that have applied the discretions available under ss 1317S and 
1318 CA in order to absolve directors either fully or partially from liability. Empirical research 
published in 2009 illustrated that relief under these sections was refused in 8 out 23 cases 
examined because the courts found that directors had failed to ‘act honestly’.68 This position 
was illustrated in Re Balmz69, where Randell AsJ did not exercise his discretion under s 1317S 
CA to relieve the defendants from liability for insolvent trading. He found that the defendants 
failed to act honestly, and did not act in the best interests of the company. Instead, by their 
actions, they had sought to minimise their own personal liabilities by not complying with their 
ATO reporting and taxation payment obligations. They also failed to consider putting forward 
a deed of company arrangement before resolving to appoint an administrator. This led the court 
to conclude that the defendants took this action to avoid an application by the ATO itself to 
wind up the company in insolvency, and to minimise their own personal liabilities.70 
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Further it has been argued that the test from Hall v Poolman71 which was followed in The Stake 
Man72 has confused the purpose of ss 1317S and s 1318 CA which find their basis in equity. It 
has been argued that these sections were designed to offer relief from oppression and not to 
provide a defence to protect directors in entrepreneurial risk taking.73 It has been argued that 
sections do not provide:  
an appropriate mechanism for encouraging entrepreneurial risk-taking. There is no effective safe harbour 
for directors of companies attempting a work-out outside of external administration, or where they continue 
to operate with the reasonable belief that they can trade out of financial difficulty.74 
 
Reliance on these two provisions therefore have limited relief possibilities even for those 
directors who may have acted honestly, while undertaking entrepreneurial risk-taking but 
nevertheless are found to be in breach of their duty to not permit their company to trade whilst 
insolvent.  
1.1.2 The Defences under s 588H CA and Voluntary Administration  
There are a number of statutory defences available for directors who may be subject to a breach 
of s 588G(2) CA, found under s 588H CA: 
 That there are reasonable grounds to expect solvency;75 and/or 
 that there has been reasonable reliance on others who have provided relevant 
information;76 and/or 
 that they were absent from management for illness or for good reason;77 and/or 
 that they took reasonable steps to prevent the incurring of a debt.78 
With respect to the defence available under s 588H(2) CA – reasonable ground to expect 
insolvency, an inquiry as to s 588G(1)(c) CA relies on not the conduct of the director in 
question but on the objectively formed state of mind of a person of ordinary competence.79 In 
Re Balmz80 it was noted that the expectation under s 588H(2)  must be reasonable. In this case, 
the court held that a director could not rely on a complete ignorance of or neglect of his duty, 
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81 and a ‘sleeping director’ could not rely on their own ignorance of the company’s affairs 
which had been added to by his own lack to make further necessary inquiries.82  
 
One option available to directors under s 588H(2) CA has been for them to resign from their 
position as soon as they have reason to suspect that a company is insolvent or is approaching 
insolvency. Most problematic however, is because it is difficult to pin point the exact time 
where there is a suspicion that the company is insolvent or would become insolvent by the 
incurring of a debt, directors can be liable even after they resign. Such an approach may also 
not be in the best interests of the company as a whole. This defence and its limitations continue 
to be in question even after the 2017 insolvency law reforms.  
 
The defence available under s 588H(3) CA requires evidence that there was reasonable reliance 
on others who have provided relevant information. This defence could be argued to support the 
operation of s 588GA(2)(d) where a safe harbour may apply in circumstances where a director 
has obtained ‘advice from an appropriately qualified entity who was given sufficient 
information to give appropriate advice.’83 
 
The application of s 588H(5) CA and s 588H(6) CA provide that a defence may be supported 
if it can be shown that the director took reasonable steps to prevent the company from incurring 
the debt/s. Appointing an administrator as part of a Voluntary Administration (VA) process 
can be considered to constitute ‘reasonable steps’ under these sections, creating a type of ‘safe 
harbour’, which is still available to directors as a defence from corporate insolvent trading 
liability. This continues in addition to the safe harbour reforms of 2017.  
 
By placing the company into VA, the director’s liability can be avoided, where:  
 unsecured creditors can’t begin, continue or enforce their claims against the company 
without the administrator’s consent or the court’s permission; 
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 owners of property (other than perishable property) used or occupied by the company, 
or people who lease such property to the company, can’t recover their property; 
 except in limited circumstances, secured creditors can’t enforce their security interest 
in the company’s assets; 
 a court application to put the company in liquidation can’t be commenced; and  
 a creditor holding a personal guarantee from the company’s director or other person 
can’t act under the personal guarantee without the court’s consent.84 
The voluntary administrator ‘steps into the shoes’ of the directors and has all their powers to 
manage the company. Arguably, VA action is risky as it can also be detrimental to the company 
as a whole, because it is the company’s directors who are most familiar with the company’s 
operations, and it is they who can best assist the company to trade out of its difficulties where 
this is a reasonable possibility. It has been found that once a company is put into a VA in 
Australia, it rarely trades out of its difficulties.85 VAs in Australia have been considered to be 
an ineffective vehicle to encourage restructuring of businesses.86 This is despite the operation 
of s 435A CA, which sets out the objective of a VA is to maximise the chances of the business 
(or part of it) to continue its existence or result in a better outcome for stakeholders when 
compared to a winding up.87 These objectives in reality have rarely been met. For example, the 
Australian Productivity Commission noted in its 2015 Report that for those companies that 
enter into a VA, there are few incentives available to them to restructure, where 70% of them 
are deregistered within 4 years of the commencement of the VA.88 These actions are therefore 
not always in the best interest of the company. One example concerned the Henry Walker Eltin 
group, where directors placed the company into a VA, based on their concerns of insolvent 
trading.89 ‘Ultimately, all creditors were paid 100 cents in the dollar but the shareholders 
experienced the destruction of the value of the business.’90 Such an outcome illustrates that the 
directors did not find themselves in a position where they could uphold their fiduciary duty to 
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act in the best interests of the company, to take appropriate business risks or to be 
entrepreneurial.  
 
Part 2.  Why Reform was Required 
A company as a separate legal entity91 has its management vested in its board of directors.92 
Shareholders, creditors and other external parties generally are not involved in management 
decision making. Therefore, (as already noted above) in order to protect their interests against 
the possible risk of directors causing harm to the company including its assets, property and 
corporate and business reputation, directors as officers of a company93 have a number of duties 
at common law, under equity and also under statute primarily in Part 2D.1 CA which they must 
abide by.  
 
In addition to these duties, directors have a further positive duty under Part 5.7B, s 588G CA 
to prevent a company from trading while insolvent. This duty is owed to the company, its 
shareholders and its creditors.94 As already noted, the duty does not relate to incurring a 
particular debt, or to creditors directly, but to maintaining the overall positive financial health 
of the company.95 The Australian insolvent trading laws prior to the 2017 reforms also focused 
on the ‘timing of when the debts [were] incurred by a company rather than the conduct of the 
directors in incurring that debt.’96 This approach created a business risk averse culture for 
directors of companies in Australia, and any question of debt restructuring of a company by 
directors, even where they had the belief that they could assist it to trade out of its difficulties, 
was generally avoided.97 The fear of personal liability was also felt to be disincentivising 
persons from taking on director roles.98 It was recognised by many that this was an area that 
required reform.99 For example, a survey of 600 directors from the largest public companies in 
Australia, conducted by the Australian Treasury and the Australian Institute of Company 
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Directors in 2008100 found that the fear of personal liability had an adverse impact on directors’ 
business decision making.101  
 
It was also argued that the corporate insolvent trading laws encouraged premature formal 
insolvency actions, where this may not have been in the best interests of the company, 
shareholders and creditors. Even where directors implemented a debt restructuring plan, where 
they had no reason to suspect that the company was trading while insolvent, there were 
significant risks and tensions under the insolvent trading laws under Part 5.7B CA prior to the 
introduction of the new reforms.102 In such debt restructuring circumstances, there was much 
uncertainty around times when directors were undertaking negotiations with a number of 
stakeholders, including lenders. There was a risk that some of the company’s creditors could 
lose faith in the actions that the directors were taking, and issue statutory demands, which could 
lead to a winding up of the company. Unless directors could enter into consensual restructuring 
agreements with major creditors (as occurred for Fitness First Ltd in 2012103) to avoid these 
risky situations, directors could find themselves either resigning or placing the company into 
premature voluntary administration, in order to avoid the risk of personal liability. Further, as 
discussed above, the defences under s 588H CA were not always available, and there were 
difficulties for directors solely relying on the exercise of judicial discretions under ss 1317S 
and 1318 CA for the exoneration of their liabilities associated with insolvent trading breaches 
under s 588G(2) CA. Arguably, the Australian insolvent trading laws prior to 2017 reforms 
thus presented directors with limited opportunities to take appropriate business risks, or to be 
entrepreneurial in their ventures.104  
 
In the next part of this Article the legislative provisions as implemented in September 2017 
which deal with insolvent trading laws under Part 5.7B CA, are discussed in greater detail 
together with a number of their perceived limitations and further considerations for reform.  
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Part 3.  The Australian Insolvent Trading Law Reforms of 2017 and 
Considerations for further Reform.  
On 28th of March 2017, the Australian Treasury released a legislation exposure draft as part 
of the 2017 National Innovation and Science Agenda (NISA), which was aimed to creating the 
‘safe harbour’ reforms.105 Its objectives were to apply to directors of companies undertaking a 
restructure and to protect them from personal liability for insolvent trading in certain 
circumstances. On 19 September 2017, the proposed legislative reforms received Royal Assent. 
As a result, ss 588GA and 588GB were inserted into the CA. The objective of s 588GA CA is 
to provide a ‘safe harbour’ to directors who can show that they undertook a course of action 
reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company and its creditors, in circumstances 
where they can illustrate that they had a genuine belief that they could turn around the fortunes 
of their company.106 Rather than relying on when the debts were due, as was the case under the 
previous provisions, the new provisions now focus on the conduct of the directors.107 Section 
588GA CA also provides for a triggering event where ‘a person starts to suspect the company 
may become or be insolvent.’108  
 
The 2017 safe harbour reforms have already been subject to analysis by practitioners, 
professional associations and academics,109 where some have argued that the Australian 
government may have missed the practicality of the provisions, because the legislators ‘did not 
address the key issues to the challenges facing the companies and directors’110 especially where 
support for directors to meet their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company and 
its creditors was really what was required.  
3.1 The Burden of Proof and the Limitations  
Section 588GA(1) CA notes that s 588G(2) CA will not apply to a person where, ‘at a particular 
time after they started to suspect that the company may became or be insolvent, they take a 
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course of action that is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company and the 
company’s creditors’111 and ‘the debt is incurred in connection with that course of action.’112 
This new section shifts the evidential burden of bringing an action for a contravention of s 
588G(2) CA to those who wish to rely on the breach.113  
 
A plaintiff liquidator who wishes to bring proceedings for a breach of s 588G(2) CA, is required 
to demonstrate that on ‘the balance of probabilities, the course of action being taken was not 
one reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company.’114 It has been argued that 
this presents a ‘forensic burden for liquidators in addition to requiring that they prove the 
already difficult factual issue of insolvency at the relevant time.’115 This can lead to problems 
of illegal phoenix activity and affect the recovery of preferences.116 Arguably, the 2017 
provisions may lead to even more uncertainty for directors when deciding what actions they 
should or should not take in times of restructuring outside of formal corporate insolvency.  
3.2 Insolvency Triggers and the Limitations 
The definition of insolvency in s 95A CA in the context of determining whether a director is in 
breach of s 588G(2) CA is presumed to assist in determining whether the director or a 
reasonable person in a like position was aware at the time, that there were grounds for 
suspecting insolvency. Section 95A(1) CA defines insolvency as a situation where a company 
cannot pay its debts as and when they fall due and payable.117 This definition has been tested 
judicially in complex cases. In Sandell v Porter118 the High Court of Australia held that the 
debtor’s entire financial position was to be considered, rather than sole reference to its liquidity 
circumstances. 
 
This position was confirmed by Owen J in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corp 
(No 9)119 who noted that the cash flow test and the balance sheet test had their own deficiencies 
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when considered separately. In this case, Owen J referred to both tests to make a determination 
on the solvency of the company, relying on an examination of the company’s ‘forecast of 
continuing cash flow deficiencies, the substantial disconformity in value of its assets, the 
deterioration in value of its assets, [and] ... the deficiency of assets to liabilities ... including the 
substantial deficiency of current assets to current liabilities.’120 On appeal, the Western 
Australia (WA) Supreme Court of Appeal affirmed Owen J’s decision and dismissed 
Westpac’s appeal, also allowing for various cross-appeals made.121 Importantly these cases 
illustrate that in complex cases, both tests are to be considered contemporaneously rather than 
in isolation. This approach can give the court a ‘complete description of the company’s affairs 
from the evidence adduced [as much] as possible.’122  
 
Despite the judicial approaches taken by the courts on the scope of s 95A CA, the 2017 
insolvency law reforms did not make any changes to its statutory definition. It is arguable that 
the new legislative provisions do not provide any further assistance for directors as would have 
been expected. Accordingly, a company can be taken to be actually insolvent under s 95A CA 
if it cannot pay its debts as and when they are due. Cash flows are therefore still very important 
in this determination.123 It is argued that this area of actual insolvency requires further attention, 
as directors have no more guidance as to whether they may be in a state of insolvency or not, 
and to whom the duties are owed. For example, a company may have liquidity issues, but these 
may be short term, or a subsidiary company may no longer have the financial backing of its 
parent, or where shareholder backing is no longer available.124  
 
The definition of deemed insolvency under s 588E(4) CA also remains unchanged following 
the 2017 reforms. The purpose of s 588E(4) CA for deemed insolvency upon the failure of 
maintain proper records is ‘…to assist a liquidator in bringing recovery actions (including 
recovery actions against former directors for insolvent trading) when it is necessary to prove 
insolvency and the company’s financial records are not available.’125 Black J in Re Swan 
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Services Pty Ltd (in liq)126 noted that there is a presumption in the CA that insolvency will 
apply throughout the period in which the company has failed to maintain financial records 
under s 286(1) CA. Post 2017, directors may continue to find themselves falling foul of this 
provision, during times of financial distress where their focus may be on restructuring and not 
necessarily on the maintenance of the ‘books’. The complexity of decision making in these 
circumstances for directors has not changed. This is an area that has arguably not been given 
sufficient consideration under the 2017 reforms.  
3.3  Timing of Debts, the Safe Harbour and the Limitations  
Further, the 2017 reforms do not give any guidance to directors in determining how long they 
have for the safe harbour to operate. ‘Most problematic is that a safe harbour, which 
commences at the beginning of taking an action, will end at a time which is ‘reasonable’ for a 
particular company. Reasonable time’ under the new provision s 588GA(1)(b) CA is not 
defined. ‘Reasonable time’ can differ depending on the nature of the company, and whether it 
is a large or small organisation. Again, this adds further uncertainly for directors who find 
themselves placed in such circumstances.  
 
Considering the timing when the debts are incurred is still problematic under the new 
provisions. The 2017 reforms appear to require directors to examine each and every debt to 
determine whether to act where they start ‘to suspect that the company is insolvent or may 
become insolvent.’127 The safe harbour for directors in relation to debts will apply where those 
debts are connected directly or indirectly with the course of action they have undertaken that 
will be reasonably likely to offer a better return on the dollar. Once the safe harbour time period 
has lapsed – what then? There is no guidance given under the 2017 reforms. The Explanatory 
Memorandum did give some guidance noting that ‘debts taken for the specific purpose of 
affecting a restructure as part of that course (for example paying a professional turnaround 
advisor to provide on the course of action)’128 could be included under the safe harbour 
however this arguably does not go far enough to assist directors where other types of debt could 
be incurred. It is posited in this Article that a better approach would be to consider debts as a 
whole when taking a ‘course of action that is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for 
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the company and the company’s creditors.’129 This would require consideration of all debts 
taken together, rather than by examining each one in isolation.  
3.4  What is a ‘Better Outcome? 
The 2017 reforms also raise the question as to whether the new provisions adequately assist 
directors in choosing a course of action that is reasonably likely to lead to a ‘better outcome’ 
for the company. The 2017 reforms require that directors demonstrate that creditors, the 
company and its shareholders would be in a better position because of the course of action they 
have undertaken, when compared to putting the company into some form of administration. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the 2017 legislative reforms indicated that a ‘better outcome’ 
rested on what was reasonably likely and ‘require that there is a chance of achieving a better 
outcome that is not fanciful or remote, but is “fair”, “sufficient” or “worth noting”. ’130 While 
this goes someway in assisting directors, it is argued in this Article that it does not go far 
enough. The hope to take positive action is not included.131 Thus for those directors who let 
things slide, they will not be able to utilise the new safe harbour provisions.132  
 
Notably, there is a non-exhaustive list provided for under s 588GA(2) CA which sets out what 
is required to be considered when assessing whether a director is taking a course of action that 
will be likely to lead to a ‘better outcome’ for the company in these circumstances. To date, 
there have been limited cases which have considered the safe harbour provisions and what 
amounts to a course of action that can lead to a ‘better outcome’ under s 588GA CA. ‘Better 
outcome’ was considered in the recent case of Re Balmz Pty Ltd (in liq) 133 (Re Balmz). In Re 
Balmz, the liquidator sought compensation in his capacity as liquidator and on behalf of the 
company from the defendants Mr and Mrs Patch, the directors of the company, for not 
preventing the company from trading whilst insolvent. Mrs Patch’s submissions interalia relied 
on the applicability of the safe harbour under s 588GA CA, in order to address the issue of 
insolvent trading. Her submission in this regard relied on the engagement of accountant and 
business consultants ‘Your Business Angels’ to demonstrate that a ‘plan’ had been put together 
that had a chance of placing the company in a ‘better position’.134 However, the court found no 
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evidence which set out the terms of engagement of ‘Your Business Angels”, and further, the 
court found that s 588GA CA had no application as the debts in question owed to the Australian 
Tax Office (ATO) had been incurred prior to the engagement of ‘Your Business Angels’ or 
alternatively they were not incurred in connection with any relevant ‘course of action’. Further 
the court noted that the company had failed to pay entitlements of the employees and they also 
failed to comply with the requirements from the ATO.135 As such the criteria requirements of 
s 588GA CA were not supported.  
 
Consideration of s 588GA CA was also raised in Habrok (Dalgaranga) Pty Ltd v Gascoyne 
Resources Ltd 136 (Harbrok). In Harbrok the plaintiff  Habrok sought to terminate a Deed of 
Arrangement (DOCA) that had been executed on 26 June 2020 by the first to the seventh 
defendants (the GCY Group) plus the eighth defendant, the company’s appointed 
administrators, seeking instead to appoint liquidators. The company’s administrators had been 
appointed on 2 June 2019, where they investigated the options to either recapitalise the GCY 
Group or alternatively sell off the GCY Group’s assets which included the Dalgaranga gold 
mine in Western Australia. The administrator’s DOCA recommended a recapitalisation. At the 
second creditors meetings, the holding company of Harbrok, Habrok Mining Pty Ltd (Habrok 
Mining), put forward one of the two alternative DOCA proposals. At the time, Harbrok was 
not a creditor of any entity from the GCY Group, and only submitted the alternative DOCA on 
the day before the second creditors meetings. At this time, the creditors voted not to adjourn, 
but instead voted to execute the administrator’s DOCA. Despite steps being taken to implement 
the administrator’s DOCA, Harbrok sought its termination under s 445D CA, based on a 
number of factors which included, interalia the allegation that there was a risk that related to 
the future insolvency of the GCY Group, despite the proposed capital raising. This was based 
on the GCY Group previously seeking advice from the consulting group FTI (who were later 
the appointed administrators) in late December 2018 as to whether the safe harbour protection 
under s 588GA CA from insolvent trading claims was available to the board. Harbrok argued 
that this raised a conflict of interest between the administrators and the board. The court 
however dismissed this argument, noting that FTI’s prior work with the GCY Group did not 
impair their independence or objectivity, where Beach J noted ‘FTI did not provide advice on 
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safe harbour, on a turnaround plan or restructuring…’.137 The outcomes of these two early cases 
which briefly consider the application of the 2017 safe harbour provisions of s 588GA CA have 
not added any further guidance however on what a ‘better outcome’ means in the context of 
restructuring activities under the 2017 reforms. 
 
Additional uncertainties can also arise for directors who take actions that are reasonably likely 
to lead to a ‘better outcome’ for the company, but are not ‘actions’ that fall under the s 
588GA(2) CA parameters. In order to address some of these additional uncertainties, guidelines 
have been developed by the Australian Turnaround Management Association (ATMA), which 
cover actions such as: 
 Undertaking an initial assessment of financial position of the company; 
 assessing the safe harbour options; 
 entering a turnaround plan; and  
 monitoring performance.138 
Despite these guidelines, it is still unknown what emphasis courts will also place on factors 
that fall outside of the s 588GA(2) CA provisions.  
3.5  Restructuring Advisors and the Risks  
A further criticism of the 2017 insolvency law reforms has been that company directors are 
still ‘more or less’ in the same position as that they were before because there is no legislatively 
required ‘formally appointed’ restructuring advisor providing an accurate and rational 
assessment to directors of the company’s solvency. For example, the 2017 reforms provide that 
directors can still be ‘liable where it can be shown that they are not taking a course of action 
reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company and its creditors as a whole rather 
than proceeding to immediate administration or liquidation.’139 Section 588GA(2)(d) CA does 
set out that one consideration which could assist in determining whether a course of action is 
reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company, is where directors obtain advice 
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from ‘an appropriately qualified entity.’140 However such an entity is not defined nor is the 
appointment of one legislatively mandated.  
 
While the Australian Turnaround Management Association (ATMA) provided guidelines 
which indicated that such a person should be appropriately qualified,141 it has been argued that 
there may be an emergence of ‘unregulated pre-insolvency advisors to sell themselves as 
experts who can work within the requirements of the new law.’142 These persons acting as pre-
insolvency advisors are to be distinguished from other professionals who provide legitimate 
advice about restructuring such as qualified accountants and lawyers, acting as experienced 
specialists. Arguably, under the 2017 insolvency law reforms, when engaging pre-insolvency 
advisors (who may or may not be professionally qualified), directors may incur even more debt 
and open themselves up to unscrupulous characters who may take advantage of their 
vulnerabilities, 143 where the advice provided could be ‘intended to benefit directors over 
creditors, recommend hiding or stripping assets and, at best, skirts the law if not flagrantly 
violates it.’144 It is argued that the 2017 insolvency law reforms (notwithstanding the 2021 
legislative changes which were recently introduced that interalia addresses this issue to a 
degree for eligible small company businesses only – see discussion below) should be amended 
to ensure that all external advisors are appropriately qualified, that they operate under a 
regulated industry and act independently.145 In 2019, the Australian Restructuring Insolvency 
and Turnaround Association (ARITA) conducted a survey of its members in order to gauge the 
impact of non-regulated pre-insolvency advisors on the industry at that time.146 Over 300 
respondents participated in the survey. Fifty percent of respondents felt that the influence of 
pre-insolvency advisors was greater or slightly increased compared to 2 years prior. Thirty 
percent of respondents felt that increased regulation was the single best way to reduce the 
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influence of such advisers, while forty percent felt that stronger enforcement of existing laws 
was required.147 
 
As one answer to addressing these concerns, in early 2020 the Combatting Illegal Phoenixing 
Act (2020) (Cth) (CIPA) and the Registries Modernization & Other Measures Act 2020 (Cth) 
(RMOMA) were enacted. The CIPA was designed to inter alia address some of the concerns 
surrounding the existence and activities of non-regulated pre-insolvency advisors. Its 
objectives are to have laws dealing with the dispositions of company property that are designed 
to defeat creditor claims; to address the backdating of director resignations where they are 
designed to avoid director liability; to introduce Goods and Services Tax (GST) liability for 
directors in certain circumstances; to permit the ATO to withhold any tax refunds in certain 
circumstances; and to also prevent creditors from facilitating illegal phoenix activity through 
their voting powers at creditors meetings during external administration situations.148 It was 
noted in the CIPA’s Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum that Australian businesses, employees 
and the government incurred costs between AUD $2.85 billion and AUD $5.13 billion in 
previous years from such activities.149 The CIPA consists of 4 chapters that addresses creditor 
defeating dispositions, director resignations, GST liabilities and retention of tax refunds. The 
RMOMA has introduced a Director Identification Number (DIN), which can provide regulatory 
bodies and potential creditors with the ability to examine a director’s history and provide for 
greater transparency. It could be argued that the CIPA and RMOMA form part of the additional 
reforms to the corporate insolvent trading provisions under the CA. It is not for this Article 
however to explore these new Acts and their impact on the CA insolvency reforms.  
3.6   Ipso facto Clauses Reform and the Limitations  
Also referred to ‘by the fact itself’, ipso facto clauses in commercial contracts, in circumstances 
of an insolvency event, can cover the termination of the contract either automatically or at the 
discretion of an affected party; or for rights under the contract to be modified; or for the 
repossession of affected property. 
 
An insolvency event generally will refer to the company entering into external administration.  
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Under the 2017 insolvency law reforms, the Australian government has provided for a stay on 
ipso facto clauses during the formal external administration process. These amendments negate 
the effect of ipso facto clauses on certain types of contracts and contractual rights. The intention 
of this legislative approach is to give companies more of an opportunity to optimize and 
stabilize the company after a restructure and to provide an increased chance of selling the 
business.150 Section 588GA(1)(a) CA reflects this objective where it states ‘one or more 
courses of action that are reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company.’151 As 
long as there is a suspicion of insolvency then this is adequate to trigger the section.  
 
It is arguable that the treatment of ipso facto clauses under the 2017 insolvency law reforms do 
not go far enough. The moratorium does not assist in those circumstances where creditors and 
suppliers refuse to extend a new line of credit to companies in times of restructure. In addition, 
it has been noted ‘the reforms do not go far enough, because the right of a secured creditor with 
a security interest over the whole - or substantially the whole - of the company’s property to 
appoint a receiver in the decision period will still exist.’152 Further attention to this area of the 
insolvent trading laws is therefore required.  
3.7   Non-Applicability of the 2017 Safe Harbour Provisions  
Directors/persons will not be able to rely on the safe harbour provisions in those circumstances 
where they do not comply with the requirements placed upon them by either an external 
administrator or liquidator. Under s 588GB(1) CA directors / persons cannot rely on books or 
information to support a safe harbour for their actions taken if they do not permit the inspection 
or delivery of those books or information by a relevant person.  
  
This limiting provision will not apply if directors/persons can show under s 588GB(3) CA that 
they didn’t possess those books or information or there were no reasonable steps that they could 
have taken to obtains the books or information. The provisions under s 588GB CA limit a 
director’s/person’s reliance on information that may have come to light or to the attention of 
the director after they were directed to provide such information. It is arguably a peculiar 
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provision, as it alludes to covering books or documents that may not actually exist. Further, the 
provision provides an exemption where the director/person is not provided with notice that a 
failure to provide such books or information when requested. Again, this is problematic 
because under s 530A(1) CA, liquidators are not obliged to notify directors that a failure to do 
so will prevent them from later relying on such evidence to support a safe harbour defence. 
These issues need further consideration to remove these additional uncertainties.  
3.8  Disclosure under the CA and Continuous Disclosure under Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX), Listing Rule 3.1  
Disclosures to the market and to other stakeholders is also an issue that has not been dealt with 
adequately under the 2017 insolvency law reforms. It appears that this has been left to 
companies to decide when and if they should disclose to stakeholders those actions being taken 
under s 588GA(2) CA. Arguably, this could be considered an appropriate approach, as 
disclosure during a company’s restructure could undermine stakeholders’ confidence which 
would be more detrimental to the company at that critical time. However, for disclosing 
entities, the operation of the ASX Listing Rule 3.1 together with ss 674 and 675 CA, the 
continuous disclosure rules would nevertheless apply if actions taken under s 588GA(2) CA 
trigger continuous disclosure obligations. If continuous disclosure provisions for these 
disclosing entities are not complied with, liability can be imposed upon the company involved 
and this may also to extend to directors.153 Disclosing entities, when undertaking actions under 
s 588GA(2) CA therefore may find themselves subject to investor class actions where they fail 
to keep the market informed of material information. 154 This could be avoided where they can 
make out the applicability of one or more of the ‘carve out’ provisions under the ASX Listing 
Rule 3.1A. If any one of the carve outs apply, then directors will avoid personal liability under 
s 674 CA. The carve outs include circumstances where information relates to an incomplete 
proposal or negotiation155 which may or may not apply to actions under s 588GA(2) CA. 
However, if any information is leaked to the public, the carve out provisions no longer can 
operate to provide protections. Again, the company and/ or its directors may be in breaches of 
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the law and the ASX Listing Rules. It is posited in this Article that these issues have not been 
adequately dealt with under the 2017 insolvent trading legislative reforms. 
Part 4.  COVID-19 2020 Temporary Measures and the 2021 Small Company 
Business Reforms  
4.1  The 2020 Emergency Measures and their Shortcomings  
In early 2020, the actual and potential economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic provided 
the impetus for the Australian government to step in and provide temporary measures to further 
assist companies experiencing financial hardship. The Coronavirus Economic Response 
Package Omnibus Act 2020 (Cth) was introduced on 25 March 2020. As one measure of 
government assistance, temporary reliefs for companies experiencing financial distress due to 
the negative economic impacts of COVID-19 pandemic were provided for under the new 
s588GAAA CA. These included: 
 a six month insolvent trading moratorium to address liability of directors for insolvent 
trading (not including those cases where insolvent trading falls under s 588G(3) CA)156 
 An extension of the statutory demand period for compliance from 21 days to 6 
months.157 
 An increase in the threshold at which creditors could take action against the company 
under a statutory demand from $2, 000 to $20,000.158 
There were some concerns however that the temporary measures did not go far enough to assist 
directors of Australian companies in these trying times. Directors could still be liable for 
breaches of their directors’ duties under ss 180(1) and 181 CA in respect of debts being incurred 
which could fall under s588GAAA CA. For example, a breach of corporate insolvency laws 
could also be a breach of a director’s duty to act with a degree of care and diligence that a 
reasonable person would do so in the circumstances under s 180(1) CA.  Further, a breach of 
corporate insolvency laws could also be a breach of a director’s duty to act in good faith and 
in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose under s181 CA.159 These risks 
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continued for directors during the period of the insolvent trading moratorium. It was 
recommended by the Australian Law Council that this risk of exposure should have been also 
considered, where they noted that it ‘undermine[d] the effectiveness of the new moratorium on 
insolvent trading claims in s 588GAAA CA… .’160 They posited that further legislative changes 
were required as it was ‘…necessary to facilitate continuation of business in circumstances 
relating to the coronavirus known as COVID-19, and in order to mitigate the economic impact 
of COVID-19.’161 They also noted that even if breaches of ss 180(1) and 181 CA were 
addressed, this would not address breaches of directors duties at common law.162 Another 
concern related to the requirements of s 588GA(4) CA which continued to apply. This section 
requires that there is substantial compliance that all employee entitlements are paid when due, 
and that there is substantial compliance with all tax matters.163 It was argued by the Law 
Council of Australia that s 588GA(4) CA requirements would hamper the operation and 
effectiveness of the temporary assistance measures under s 588GAAA CA. They argued that 
for a company to trade during the moratorium, they would need to incur trading debts, which 
would take priority over unsecured debts (including employee entitlements) so as to avoid 
being would up.164  
 
Testing the effectiveness of the 2020 temporary moratorium provisions has yet to be 
determined. These temporary measures predominately concluded for most companies on 31 
December 2020. From this date, the additional safe harbour protections for directors under 
s588GAAA CA reverted to those available under the 2017 reforms i.e. s 588GA CA, and with 
the minimum debt for creditor statutory demands reverting to the pre COVID-19 $2,000 
statutory amount, and debtors again having the original 21 days to respond. 
4.2  The 2021 Small Company Business Insolvency Law Reforms 
While the temporary COVID-19 pandemic related statutory measures ceased on 31 December 
2020, on 1 January 2021, the Corporations Amendment (Corporate Insolvency Reforms) Act 
2020 (Cth) (IR Act) and corresponding amendments made to other related Acts including the 
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Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) were then introduced. These new legislative approaches were 
made in order to provide continuing restructuring support or for a simplified liquidation 
process, for small company businesses in times of financial difficulty.165  
 
The 2021 reforms go some way to addressing some of the limitations of the 2017 insolvency 
law reforms as noted above.  The IR Act and corresponding amendments made to other related 
Acts including the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) have been designed to provide more flexibility 
for small companies who are faced with two choices in times of financial difficulty. 1: In order 
to survive they must consider restructuring their operations; or 2: to alternatively liquidate their 
company but with less administrative difficulties and less costs.166  
 
With respect to restructuring operations, the 2021 reforms under the IR Act have introduced a 
‘debtor in possession’ process, similar to that described under the US Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
provisions (see discussion on the US approach below). Unlike the VA process, where the 
voluntary administrator takes control of the company, the 2021 reforms permits an eligible 
small company business which is facing external administration, to be able to restructure 
existing debts while continuing to trade, under the control of its own directors.167 This approach 
can support directors of eligible companies in financial distress to formulate a plan which 
permits them to pay off existing debts, to continue to trade and to ultimately avoid possible 
liquidation.  
 
In order to access 2021 reforms for restructuring under the IR Act, and corresponding 
provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) eligibility criteria must however first be met. 
These include: total debts are less than the prescribed amount (currently at $1 million AUD); 
that all ATO lodgements and employee entitlements of the company are up to date; and that no 
directors or former directors of the company have been involved with a Small Business Debt 
Restructuring (SBDR) process in the last 7 years. 168  
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The 2021 reforms under the IR Act also provide for a simplified liquation process169 where 
directors of a company can give a liquidator a declaration where they believe (on reasonable 
grounds) that the company can meet the eligibility criteria for the simplified liquidation 
process.170 The eligibility criteria requirements for a simplified liquidation process to be 
adopted by a liquidator require: a triggering event;171 the provision of reports on the company’s 
business affairs and a declaration of eligibility for a simplified liquidation process under ss 
497(4) and 498 CA; a declaration that the company will be unable to pay its debts in full within 
no more than twelve months from the date of the triggering event; or where the test for 
eligibility is based on the liabilities of the company – that test is determined on the day of the 
triggering event; that the company and its current directors and past directors within twelve 
months of the triggering event have not previously undergone a restructuring event or have 
been the subject of a simplified liquidation process within the last 7 years; and that the company 
is up to date with its tax returns and taxation reporting obligations.172  
 
While the 2021 reforms under the IR Act and corresponding legislative updates to other related 
Acts, including the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 2001 are a step forward to aiding small 
company businesses which are experiencing financial distress, is argued in this Article that 
they do not go far enough. Eligibility criteria for both restructuring and simplified liquidation 
processes should be broadened so that the 2021 reforms can apply to a wider range of 
Australian corporations. This could ensure that all directors of all Australian corporations are 
supported to meet their obligation to act in the best interests of their corporation. This approach 
could further encourage appropriate business risk taking under legislatively supported 
processes.  
 
In the next and final part of this Article, international approaches taken in the areas of 
insolvency law are briefly canvassed. An overview is provided in order to further inform what 
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additional reforms to the Australian corporate insolvent trading laws under the CA may be 
undertaken.  
Part 5.  International Corporate Insolvency Law Approaches 
5.1  United States (US)  
In this section a brief overview of the US approach to its corporate insolvent trading laws is 
provided. Historically in the US, debt restructuring of businesses that found themselves in 
financial distress was encouraged under the US federal law, and by the American courts.173 For 
example, the early twentieth century in the US was a time for business growth,174 however 
some firms were finding themselves in financial distress. Nevertheless, complex debt 
restructuring by managers and directors of such companies was still being encouraged at that 
time.175 By the 1960s, legislative reforms were introduced in the US with a focus on 
restructuring of businesses within the protection of the law. In the 1980s de-regulation 
initiatives in the finance sector were introduced.176 These initiatives had, for the next decade, 
an effect on corporate bankruptcy in the US where ‘many of the deals of this era (the deal to 
take Macy’s private, for example) were to be the bankruptcies of the next decade.’177 By the 
2000s Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Code), was being relied on by many 
large organisations in the US, who found themselves in financial distress, to reorganise their 
affairs, rather than implementing an insolvency action under a Chapter 7 liquidation.178  
 
In current times, under the Code, businesses that identify an inability to service their debt can 
file with the deferral bankruptcy court for protection under Chapter 7 of the Code. Under 
Chapter 7 of the Code, a process of liquidation applies, where operations cease, a trustee steps 
in to sell all of the business assets and then distribute the balance to creditors. Under Chapter 
11 of the Code however, businesses will generally divest their operations to the debtor, as a 
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‘debtor in possession’, within the oversight and jurisdiction of the court.179 In this way, Chapter 
11 of the Code can permit directors to ‘retain control of the company subject to close court 
supervision.’180 Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides for three outcomes for a business. This 
includes: reorganisation, conversion to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, or dismissal.181  
 
Reorganisation under Chapter 11 of the Code is possible where a debtor files with the court a 
plan of reorganisation. Under § 1129 of the Code, the bankruptcy court will generally approve 
the plan where it is satisfied that it complies with the applicable law, is feasible, is made in 
good faith and it is not likely to be followed by liquidation or further reorganisation.182 Chapter 
11 of the Code provides for a number of restructuring tools and options to the ‘debtor in 
possession’. For example, the ‘debtor in possession’ can seek new financing options, and they 
are protected against other litigation by a “stay” under § 362 of the Code. The objective is for 
the business to eventually emerge as a going concern. This can take months or even years. It 
can lead to better outcomes for employees, debtors, creditors, shareholders, directors and the 
economy.  
 
It is acknowledged that this Article has provided for only a brief overview of the US Code. 
Australia has already adopted a US Chapter 11 style approach of ‘debtor in possession’ under 
the Australian 2021 insolvency law reforms for eligible small company businesses (as 
discussed above). These 2021 reforms may demonstrate how some aspects of a US Code style 
approach can be a positive step forward for small Australian companies that may find 
themselves in financial distress. This new development can also provide support for further 
reforms to the Australian corporate insolvency laws which could apply to all Australian 
companies and for all Australian directors in the future. Broadening this approach so that it can 
apply to all Australian companies may also address the reputational damage for directors that 
that comes from placing their companies into voluntary administration in times of financial 
distress. In Australia it can be argued that the voluntary administration process leads to ‘identity 
loss’ and that an insider alternative to the current external administration approach for all 
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Australian companies could be a beneficial policy change. This could provide directors of all 
Australian companies, in times of corporate restructuring, with more certainty in exercising 
their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their company. 
5.2  New Zealand (NZ) 
In New Zealand, under s 135 of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) (CANZ) the corporate insolvent 
trading laws refer to ‘reckless trading’ provisions which apply to directors:  
(a) who agree to the business of the company being carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial 
risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors; (b) or cause or allow the business of the company to be 
carried on in a manner likely to create substantial risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors.183  
 
If directors are found to be in breach of s 135 CANZ, the corporate veil may be lifted where 
directors can be held personally liable for some or all of a liquidated company’s losses. In 
Mason v Lewis184 the NZ Court of Appeal commented that s 135 of the Companies Act 1993 
(NZ) provides that directors owe the duty to the company (not to any particular creditors). This 
duty is applied objectively and does not rest on the directors’ belief. In particular the court has 
noted ‘what is required when the company enters troubled financial waters is ... a “sober 
assessment” by the directors ... of an ongoing character, as to the company’s likely future 
income and prospects.’185 Under s 301 CANZ, on application by a liquidator, a creditor or a 
shareholder, the court can order directors to pay, by way of compensation, an amount that ‘the 
court thinks just’.186 
 
Two recent cases highlight two different approaches taken by NZ courts in determining when 
a breach of s135 CANZ has occurred and the remedies to be applied. In Mainzeal Property and 
Construction Ltd (in liq) v Yan187, the directors of Mainzeal Construction were found to be 
liable for ongoing trading of the company while it was in a ‘vulnerable state’. They were found 
to be liable for all of the company’s trading losses on liquidation, of around $110 million NZ 
dollars. The directors were also imposed personally with a compensation award under s 301 
CANZ of $36 million NZ dollars. In the latter case of Cooper v Debut Homes Ltd (in liq)188, 
the NZ Court of Appeal however reaffirmed orthodox principles, finding that ongoing trading 
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by a director of a distressed residential property developer was not reckless, and that trading 
whilst insolvent did not automatically mean that director liability was made out. The court 
noted that risk is to be considered alongside potential advantage. In this case, the court found 
that the decision by the director to complete the houses was the better commercial decision 
when compared to not completing them and walking away.  
 
The insolvency law in NZ is thus based not on the mere fact of insolvency and a reasonable 
suspicion of insolvency, but rather on legitimate and illegitimate business taking risks where 
the former can allow directors to continue to trade if they have ‘realistic prospects of generating 
sufficient revenue to meet current and future liabilities.’189 It can be argued that the Australian 
provisions with regards to insolvency can also benefit from such an approach, where the focus 
should not be on ‘suspicion of insolvency’ which can be difficult to gauge (as noted above) but 
rather on the taking of ‘legitimate business’ risks.  
5.3  United Kingdom (UK) 
In the UK, under s 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), a wrongful trading breach is somewhat 
similar in nature to the operation of s 588G(2) CA in Australia. The UK provisions also 
consider that a company is insolvent where it cannot meet its obligations, based on ‘whether 
the state of the company’s financial affairs are such that it can be said to be in a state of financial 
distress.’190 The Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) also encompasses fraudulent trading provisions191 
together with the wrongful trading provisions.192 Fraudulent trading will apply where a 
business is carried on with the purpose to defraud creditors, with criminal sanctions applying. 
A breach of the wrongful trading provisions however, will occur where a director ‘knew or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid 
going into insolvent liquation.’193 There is however no definitive legislative definition of 
insolvency in the UK. A determination of insolvency relies on a number of tests as set out in 
various statutes, the main ones being the cash flow test and the balance sheet test.194 Under s 
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123(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), a cash flow test rests on ‘whether or not the company 
can pay its debts as and when they fall due’.195 Section 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) 
then refers to the balance sheet test, where a consideration of whether the assets of the company 
are sufficient to pay for the liabilities of the company applies. The application of the balance 
sheet test taken on its own has not been a precise matter however. In Deiulemar Shipping SpA 
v Transfield ER Futures Ltd196 the High Court held that balance sheet insolvency could not be 
made out solely on the basis of fluctuations in the value of the defendant’s assets which caused 
the company to be in an unfavourable financial position.197  
 
In the BNY Corporate Trustee Service Ltd v Eurosail,198 the UK Court of Appeal and the UK 
Supreme Court also considered the balance sheet test under s 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 
(UK). Both courts rejected the view that the balance sheet test in s123(2) of the Insolvency Act 
1986 (UK) would only apply when the ‘point of no return’ had been reached. Following this 
case, directors of companies the UK now have some comfort in that their company’s financial 
position will not be judged based on some mathematical determination of subtracting its 
liabilities from its assets. The balance sheet test is thus to be viewed as a supplementary 
approach when applying the cash flow test. The UK courts have also recently reaffirmed 
directors common law duty to consider the interests of creditors before actual insolvency, in 
those circumstances where they knew or should have known that insolvency was likely.199 
These approaches are very similar in approach to that taken by the courts in Australia (as 
discussed above). 
 
The UK wrongful trading provisions are focused on ‘a lack of reasonable prospects of saving 
the company from liquidation,’200 and allow directors to restructure and continue to trade where 
there is a reasonable prospect that the company will not go into liquidation if they do so. These 
‘wrongful trading’ provisions can allow for appropriate risk taking and entrepreneurial activity, 
and arguably go even further than the 2017 Australian insolvency law reforms permit.  
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Prior to 2017, the corporate insolvent trading laws in Australia were in dire need for reform, as 
they affected directors’ decision making, in those circumstances where they could/ should have 
taken appropriate business risks, but did not for fear of personal liability being imposed upon 
them. The defences under s 588H CA were and continue to be limited, and the judicial 
discretions provided for under ss1317S and 1318 CA cannot be relied upon to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity, nor are they appropriate restructuring tools that directors should rely 
on.  
 
It has now been three years since the introduction of the 2017 reforms to the insolvency laws 
in Australia. Section 588HA CA required that the reforms be reviewed after 2 years of 
implementation, however to date this has not formally occurred. It could be argued that the 
delay was due to the two-year review period being too short for the laws to be effectively 
reviewed, together perhaps with the impact of COVID-19 in 2020. The 2017 reform provisions 
have only been judicially considered in a limited way to date and a number of the 2017 
insolvency law reforms limitations do require further consideration. Notably, the recent 
reforms introduced in January 2021 under the IR Act and other associated Acts including the 
CA do go some way to further assist eligible small company businesses and their directors. 
These reforms appear to draw from the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy US Code. It is argued that as 
well as addressing many of the limitations associated with the 2017 insolvency law reforms as 
identified in this Article, consideration should also be given to broadening the 2021 IR Act 
approach to all directors of all Australian companies where it can provide a workable and 
adequately supported ‘safe harbour’ in times of corporate financial and operational 
restructuring (outside of formal insolvency) for all Australian directors. To do so will more 
effectively promote entrepreneurship and innovation in Australia, and one which supports 
directors of all Australian companies to take actions that are in the best interests of their 
companies.  
  
